We revisit the idea that textbook publishers revise frequently in order to "kill o¤" the market for used books. While this view has been around for quite some time, there is an in ‡uential strand of literature in durable goods theory that challenges this idea. Recent empirical …ndings show that publishers are more likely to revise when the market share of used books increases. We show that the theories of the textbook market based on optimal durability are inconsistent with these …ndings. We then show how the alternative models of time inconsistency and quality distortion can better match these empirical …ndings. We also discuss how the recent innovations in the textbook market, such as leasing and durability reductions, relate to each of the three models.
Introduction
Recent empirical work in the textbook market has challenged the long-standing idea that publishers revise frequently to eliminate competition with used books (see Chevalier and Goolsbee 2009 ).
While the textbook market has long been a poster child for planned obsolescence, this new evidence illustrates the need to better empirically distinguish between the relevant models of durability in this market. Therefore the aim of this paper is to provide such an analysis and generate predictions speci…c to the textbook market.
Durability choice is a classic topic in the literature on durable goods, (ex. Swan 1970 , 1971 , 1972 , Miller 1974 , and Benjamin and Kormendi 1974) . The question on whether producers of durable goods have an incentive to limit the usefulness of used products has been debated for over forty years. The reasoning behind planned obsolescence in this market is thus; Even though textbooks may not physically deteriorate, a revision adversely a¤ects the value of used books. The publisher therefore has the ability to a¤ect the value of the used textbook through the revision decision.
Some economists believe the idea of planned obsolescence to be somewhat naive. 1 Peter Swan states, "Clearly it is not the existence of a secondhand market per se which need imply any restraint on the pro…tability or the pricing decision of a publisher. . . the pure publisher selling such a durable item as an automobile is paid an amount which re ‡ects the net present value of the stream of automobile services to possibly a whole host of future owners. Competitive secondhand auto dealers (or scrap merchants in the case of aluminum) can then buy and sell the item inde…nitely without in any way restricting the power of the publisher as the original seller." (Swan 1980 ) His main contention rests on the assumption that the resale value of the good is contained in the price of the new good. In this case, anything that harms the value of the good in the future will also harm the new purchase price. Under various assumptions he …nds that the publisher will always chose durability to minimize production costs.
Other models of durability relax some of Swan's assumptions and …nd di¤erent results. There is a strand of literature that assumes that …rms are unable to commit to future actions. Under these assumptions Swan's optimal durability result does not hold. The e¤ect of future actions on current pro…tability are not internalized when the …rm makes the decisions in the future (see Waldman 1993 Waldman , 1996a Choi 1994; and Nahm 2004) .
Another strand of literature examines how new and used product quality di¤erences can a¤ect the durability decision. They show that the presence of low quality used goods can adversely a¤ect the pro…tability of selling the higher quality goods. In these models, the producer has an incentive to reduce the value of the low quality used goods in order to make higher pro…ts (see Waldman 1996b, 1997; and Hendel and Lizzeri 1999).
When looking for evidence of planned obsolescence, the textbook market is ideal for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned above, many industry insiders state that planned obsolescence exists in this market. Second, although there are many producers in the textbook market, once individual instructors decide on which book to use, the textbook publisher has monopoly power on that group of students. Third, textbooks are primarily sold between academic terms. Therefore a periodic model is ideal as it is more tractable and realistic. Fourth, students are often required to use the version of the text that the instructor prescribes. Old editions are rendered nearly valueless when a new edition is printed. Updating and publishing only the new edition e¤ectively 'kills o¤' the used book market.
In this paper, we build a two period model of the textbook market that nests the three main frameworks of durability choice. In all models, the publisher makes its revision decision based on the proportion of used books that remain in the market in the later periods.
The proportion of used books in the market is determined as follows. After students use the book initially, there is a probability that they will want to keep the book as a reference. We assume that they value only the speci…c book that they used in the previous period. The books that are kept by students do not enter the textbook market in the next period.
The destruction of the used book market is not the only reason why publishers update textbooks.
The value of textbooks whether used or new depends on if the material is up to date. Textbooks may be edited periodically in order to stay relevant. Our model allows for such considerations.
The proportion of students that keep their book depends on the state of the world. If the book is regarded as a standard reference book, more students will decide to keep their book. If the book does not earn this status, there will be more used books in the market. After the publisher sees the book's status, it has the option of revising the textbook in the second period. Revising the book improves the quality of the book while reducing the sale price of all old books to zero. There is a …xed cost incurred by the publisher to update to a new edition. We examine how the state of the world (and consequently the number of used textbooks in the market) a¤ects the revision decision.
We compare these results to empirical evidence from textbook markets.
We examine the model under di¤erent variants that allow for optimal durability, quality differences, as well as time inconsistency. Under conditions satisfying optimal durability, the model suggests that the number of used books in the market will prolong the revision decision. However with time inconsistency, the number of used books makes revision more likely. Under full commit and quality di¤erences the stock of used books can have either e¤ect on revision depending on parameters.
A recent empirical study has shown that a large market share of used books speeds up the revision process (see Iizuka 2007) . In relation to this …nding, this paper argues that the optimal durability assumptions are not the correct variants of this model. The …rm has an incentive to publish a new edition in order to 'kill o¤' the market for used books. Another empirical study (Bond and Iizuka 2005) show that the stock of used books increases the sale price of new books.
In our framework this only happens when …rms can fully commit to future actions and used and new books are imperfect substitutes. Therefore we suggest that quality di¤erences best describes the textbook market.
At the end of the paper, we look a the role that leasing can play in reducing the revision incentive. We show that even without the problem of time consistency, the …rm may want to use leasing as a tool to reduce used books in the market.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide a literature review. In Section 3 we set up the model. In sections 4, 5, and 6 we analyze the model under the three di¤erent variations. Section 7 will be the conclusion. sold in bookstores for a period of 10 semesters. They …nd that consumers are forward looking with low short run discount rates and have rational expectations. They argue that this indicates that the Swan results hold and publishers have no incentive to kill o¤ the secondary market. However other models also assume forward looking consumers yet predict planned obsolescence. Since Chevalier and Goolsbee do not test the di¤erences between these models they cannot conclude which of these models is the best description of real world textbook markets..
In another empirical paper, Iizuka (2007) uses data on the market for college economics texts books to examine the revision decision. He used semi-annual textbook-level data for the years 1996-2000. Using a reduced-form discrete time duration model with time-varying covariates he analyses revision timing. He includes a number of market and book characteristics as well as a variable that captures the competition between old and new units. He …nds that publishers revise more frequently when the share of used textbooks increases. He attributes this to planned obsolescence.
Publishers will be more likely to "kill-o¤" the market for used books when the stock of used books is higher. He also …nds that time since last revision also makes revision more likely. He argues this …nding is likely caused by other factors such as improvements in book quality.
In a related paper with Bond, Iizuka (2005) uses the same data to look at the relationship between the share of used books and new sale price. They …nd that the used books in the market increases the new book price. They also present a model of the textbook pricing and production decision. There model used new/used quality di¤erences and consumer tastes and generates results consistent to their empirical …ndings. There model closely resembles the quality di¤erence variation of our model. Although there paper does not endogenize textbook revision or durability choice as ours does.
Economists have often mentioned textbooks when discussing durable goods more generally.
However, little theoretical work has been done to capture the unique features of the textbook market. 2 Because this market has a number of unique features any attempt to draw implications from previous theoretical work is di¢ cult.
The discussion about textbook revision has largely revolved around three di¤erent types of durability models. These models predict optimal durability, time inconsistency, or quality distortions.
We now brie ‡y talk about each of these models in turn. 2 With the exception of the early attempts by Miller (1974) .
In a series of papers beginning in the early seventies Swan (1970 and 1980) argued that producers of durable goods choose durability e¢ ciently. The price of a new good contains the discounted resale price of the good when it is sold secondhand. Consumers anticipate this in their decision to buy the new good. Therefore producers choose durability to minimize the cost of providing the service given by such units.
Swan's results rely on a number of key assumptions that may or may not be reasonable when considering various markets. 3 As these assumptions are relaxed we …nd theoretical evidence that planned obsolescence may in fact exist.
One key assumption in the Swan framework is the ability of a …rm to commit to future actions.
Consumers' willingness to pay for the durable good in earlier periods will depend on what they expect the value of such goods to be in the future. Actions that are optimal for the …rm in later periods may lower the value of the goods in earlier periods. This can hurt the …rm's overall pro…tability. Time inconsistency relating to output quantity has been examined in some detail (see Coase 1972, and Bulow 1982) . Bulow (1986) shows how reducing durability from early periods can partially mitigate this problem.
More recently, the time inconsistency in product revision has been examined as well (see Waldman 1993 Waldman , 1996a Choi 1994; and Nahm 2004) . For goods characterized by network externalities, Waldman (1993) shows that without commitment, a …rm's incentive to update the products is too high from the standpoints of both overall …rm pro…tability and social welfare.
Similarly Choi (1994) shows that time inconsistency leads to less backward compatibility than is socially optimal or if commitment were possible. Other papers show that time inconsistency can induce excessive R&D expenditures (see Waldman 1996a; and Nahm 2004).
Another, important assumption of the Swan argument is the perfect substitutability between new and used products. Under this assumption, every consumer is indi¤erent between a certain quantity of the used goods and a unit of the new good. 4 In the case of textbooks, students typically only value using a single book of that title. Therefore for Swan's assumption to hold in the textbook setting a single new book and a single used book must be perfect substitutes. Mussa and Rosen (1978) provide early insights on pricing a product line for non durables.
In particular, they look at a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences for quality.
They …nd that the publisher will ine¢ ciently reduce 5 the quality of the goods sold to all consumers except those with the highest taste for quality. By so doing, the publisher can increase the pro…ts made on the other consumers. Recently economists have extended these insights when modeling markets for durable goods (see Anderson and Ginsburg 1994 , Waldman 1996b , 1997 and Hendel and Lizzeri 1999) . Anderson and Ginsburg (1994) show that the secondary market may or may not be bene…cial to the durable goods monopolist. A monopolist can use the secondary market to achieve quasi second degree price discrimination. Analogous to the non durables case, Waldman (1996b) suggests that the presence of the used goods limits the high value consumers'willingness to pay for the new good. Therefore the …rm has an incentive to reduce the quality of the used good. They do this through an under investment in durability. In a later paper Waldman (1997) argues that leasing policies allow the …rm to pro…tably control the secondary market. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) show that …rms have an incentive to distort investments in durability as well as restrict consumers' ability to maintain the goods. They show that a monopolist will never want to eliminate the secondary market altogether. But they can improve pro…ts by directly controlling the secondary market through leasing.
Other papers that discuss heterogeneous quality preferences consider di¤erent frictions. For example, Lee and Lee (1998) examine price discrimination based on purchase history. This is the …rst paper to synthesize the three main types of durability models into a single framework to discuss the textbook market. By so doing, we can make testable predictions that are explicit to the speci…c nature of this market.
The Model
Consider a publisher selling textbooks for two subsequent periods. All agents are perfectly patient over this period. Each period a continuum of nonatomic buyers enters the market. Each consumer can at most consume one textbook. Buyers are heterogeneous in their preferences for quality. These preferences are represented by : is distributed uniformly on [0; 1]: A type consumer derives a bene…t of Q from consuming a book of quality Q during the …rst period he enters the market. 5 Below a level that is optimal if preferences were perfectly observed and resale was prohibited.
In the second period there are two states of the world ! 2 fh; lg. State ! occurs with probability q ! : The state of the world a¤ects the popularity of the book as a reference. In state ! a type consumer who purchased a book in period 1 will value the used book at V with probability 1 ! and zero otherwise. 6 Let 1 > h > l > 0: In each state some consumers value the book as a reference and some do not.
The valuation V represents the value the student places on keeping the book if they value it as a general reference. The states of the world represent how many students value it as a general reference within the …eld. When the publisher …rst publishes the book they don't know how popular the book will be as a reference book in the second period. When the state of the world is l; fewer students resell the used textbook because more keep the book as a general reference. Therefore, the market share of used textbooks is lower. In state h the stock of used books in the market is high because fewer consumers value the book as a reference.
If the student does not purchase a current edition, he has the outside option of purchasing a book from the outside market. The stock of older editions is su¢ ciently large as to force the market price to zero. We assume that all outside books contain the basic materials as the current edition but are in a di¤erent format. Therefore they have some value but not as much as a current edition.
The quality of the outside market text books is denoted as Q 0 : For students who purchase an older edition in the …rst period, there is a probability 1 0 = !2fh;lg q ! (1 ! ) they may also wish to keep the book as a reference for future periods. If they do, they will value the book at V .
The publisher is able to sell new textbooks in each of the two periods labeled 1 and 2: Each book has a marginal cost of c to produce new. To ease notation we denote the book quality above the outside option as Q k where k = 1; 2; U . That is, the …rst period new book quality is Q 1 + Q 0 .
In the second period the …rm can revise the book or continue to sell the old edition. If the …rm sells the old edition the new book quality is Q 1 + Q 0 and the used book quality is Q U + Q 0 ; where 7 If the publisher publishes a new edition he pays a …xed cost K > 0 and the quality of a new book is Q 2 + Q 0 Q 1 + Q 0 . Publishing the new edition reduces the quality of used books to Q 0 : The publisher and the buyers have a common discount factor of 1 and money is the 6 We assume that V is large enough that no students who value the book at V will sell them in the second period. 7 The assumption that new books of the same edition have the same quality across periods (i.e. Q1 = QN ) can be relaxed without a¤ecting any results. It may be reasonable that the older edition is less valuable in period 2 just because the information is outdated (i.e. Q1 > QN ). numerare good.
Consumers have rational expectations. Therefore, the expected sale price of a used book is incorporated into the price of the book in the …rst period. The presence of used books in the second period creates an important linkage between the periods.
The choices for the publisher include the production decision in the …rst period and the revision and production decision in each second period state of the world. We denote the revision choice as R fh; lg as the set of second period states where the publisher chooses to revise the book: The …rst period production decision is x 1 and the state ! period 2 production decision is denoted as
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the publisher chooses …rst period production levels and sells to consumers. Second, the second period state of the world is realized and …rst period consumers learn if they have a high reference value for the book or not. The publisher observes the state of the world and chooses whether or not to revise. Third, the publisher sells second period new books to the new consumers and …rst period consumer choose whether to sell their used book.
Since the equilibrium prices will depend on the revision and production decision, the publisher's pro…ts are,
where P 1 (x 1 ; x h;2 ; x l;2 ; R), and P !;2 (x 1 ; x !;2 ; R) are the inverse demand functions for new books.
We now derive the market prices for these books based on the publisher's production and revision decisions. If the …rm decides to revise the edition in state !; the equilibrium price for new books in that state is,
In a state where the …rm revises the book, the used books become part of the large stock of previous editions. Since the used …rst period books are now no longer current, the sale price of the new edition will only be a¤ected by the outside option which is not a close substitute.
If the …rm does not revise in the state !; the books of the highest quality will be consumed by the consumers with the x !;2 highest taste parameters: The used books are consumed by the next ! x 1 highest 0 s: In equilibrium, the consumer with the taste parameter equal to 1 x !;2 ! x 1 will be indi¤erent between buying a used book at the price P !;u (x 1 ; x !;2 ; R) and the outside option.
This de…nes the second period price for used books.
The new books in period 2 will be sold to consumers with the x !;2 highest s: The consumer with the taste parameter equal to (1 x 2 ) will be indi¤erent between a used book at the price P !;u (x 1 ; x !;2 ) and a new book at price P !;2 (x 1 ; x !;2 ): This de…nes the new book price in period 2 as,
The expected lifetime value of a new book to a period 1 consumer consists of three parts. The …rst is the use value in the …rst period. For a consumer with quality preference this use value is
The second part of the expected lifetime use value is the expected value as a reference book in period 2 which is
The third part is the expected resale value in the second period which is, !2fh;lgnR q ! ! P !;u (x 1 ; x !;2 ; R): To determine the …rst period price, we note that the consumer labeled (1 x 1 ) is indi¤erent between buying a book and not. We also must take into consideration the e¤ect of the outside option. The outside option has the value of
The price of a new book in period 1 is,
For ease of notation we will de…ne
This expression multiplied by the taste parameter is the expected value of the …rst period book to the …rst period consumer above the outside option.
The …rm's pro…t (1) can now be written as,
We have de…ned the pro…t of the …rm based on output and revision decisions in each state of the world. We now analyze welfare levels depending on production and revision decision. In later sections, we examine the …rm's decision under di¤erent commitment assumptions and parametrizations.
Social Welfare
In this section we compare the social planner's objective function to the monopolist's. Given the revision decision R and the outputs x 1 ; x l;2 ; and x h;2 we can determine the total value of the market to the consumers. Social welfare can be determined by the use and reference value minus costs in all stages and periods.
We …rst look at the use value of the books that are sold in a period 2 state ! to new consumers.
If the …rm has revised in state ! then the average use value of the x !;2 books is Q 2 (1
2 ). Therefore the total value of these books is x !;2 Q 2 (1
If the …rm does not revise in state ! there are some consumers who value used period 1 books.
The average value for the used books is Q U (1 x !;2
2 ): The total value of used books sold in this period is,
2 ): The new books have an average use value of Q 1 (1
The total value of these books to consumers is x !;2 Q 1 (1
2 ): New books in period 1 have a use value for that period, plus the expected reference value to period 1 customers. The average use and expected reference value for period 1 consumers is
2 ): The total value of these books to consumers is x 1 1 (1
2 ): The total welfare from this market is the total use value minus the marginal and revision costs. That is social welfare is,
Comparing this to …rm pro…t, social welfare equals,
We denote the social planner's revision decision asR Under the assumption that the publisher chooses production. In later sections we discuss how this relates to the publisher's actual revision decision.
Full Commitment
In this section we assume that the …rm is able to fully commit to both output and revision. We
show how results can di¤er depending on the substitutability between new and used books of the same edition.
Perfect Substitutability
The …rst case that we will explore corresponds to the literature on optimal durability. In these models, consumers do not care directly whether the good is new or used. They only care about the service that the good can provide. In other words, you could give the consumer enough used books to make the buyer indi¤erent between that and a new book. 8 Rather than using multiple lower quality books of the same text, it is logical that students use only one book. This condition means that books of the same edition have the same quality whether they are used or new i.e. Q 1 = Q U : 9 In order to determine the revision choice by the …rm, we …rst look at the optimal production decision for a given revision policy. The …rm will then also choose the revision policy that maximizes pro…ts.
Under the assumption Q 1 = Q U the pro…t of the …rm (8) simpli…es greatly. If the …rm does not revise in state !; used books can be sold at the same price as new books but at no additional printing cost. Since some of the …rst period books can be sold twice, the e¤ective cost of a new book is reduced by the second period used book market. The pro…t function simpli…es to,
Now there are no cross product terms between …rst and second period production decisions. The …rm's optimal production choices are,
If the publisher does not revise, the total number of books sold in the second period is
: Used books on the market perfectly crowd out new book sales. Since the expected resale price is incorporated into the initial book price this cost saving will be greater for states with a larger number of used books in the market.
We again …nd that the ability to reuse and resell the used product only improves pro…tability for the producer. The bene…t is stronger the more used books available for resale. Therefore under these assumptions, publishers should be less willing to revise when there is a large stock of used books.
Proposition 1 If Q 1 = Q U and the publisher does not revise the book in state l then it does not revise in state h: Under some conditions the …rm revises in state l only.
Proof. In appendix
Through the parameter p ! the state of the world directly a¤ects the number of used books that will be o¤ered to the market. Since h > l the stock of used books will be larger in state h. Therefore, Proposition 1 says that the decision to revise is less pro…table when the stock of used books of that edition is large. The cost saving e¤ect of not revising is the root of this result.
When the publisher does not revise the edition, used books can be resold at the new book price.
Since commitment is possible, publishers choose a revision policy to maximize lifetime pro…ts. The expected resale price of the used books is incorporated into the …rst period price. If they do not revise, the publisher can e¤ectively sell the same book in multiple periods, otherwise the used books become valueless.
The publisher may still want to revise the book in the second period if the quality of the new edition Q 2 is high enough. This quality di¤erence must be large enough to compensate for the …xed revision costs and the foregone cost saving from reselling used books. These cost savings of not revising are larger when there are more used books in the market. Therefore, if the publisher can commit it will be less likely to kill o¤ the market when there are many used books on the market. In states where there are fewer used books, the cost saving is less and the incentive to revise is greater. The result, that revision is more likely when the stock of used books is small, is inconsistent with the aforementioned work by Iizuka (2007) .
Under this variant, it is clear that the publisher would never want to revise the book unless there are meaningful quality improvements. That is, there is no incentive to revise for the sole purpose of 'killing o¤' the market for used books. The publisher may want to update the book, but it would have to be for a signi…cant quality increase.
Social Planner and Swan
Now that we have examined the publisher's revision decision we can now compare it to the social planner's. Unlike previous literature on optimal durability, we …nd that the monopolist chooses too much durability compared to the social planner. This is because the monopolist does not appropriate the di¤erence in consumer surplus from revision.
then the …rm revises in weakly (sometimes strictly) fewer states than is socially optimal.
Proof. In Appendix Corollary 1 shows us that …rm's incentive to update will always be less than the bene…t to society. Under this variant durability acts as to reduce the e¤ective marginal cost of production.
Updating improves quality. Both of these e¤ects move consumer surplus and producer surplus in the same direction. Therefore, the net social bene…t of revision will always be greater than the publisher's.
This result is somewhat di¤erent than the other papers using similar assumptions. They predict that durability choice will be optimal from both the …rm and the societal standpoint. Here we predict that revision may be less than socially optimal. This new result comes from the non stationarity of the quality of subsequent book editions. We have assumed that revised editions have higher value. The publisher revises only if the revised book is of su¢ ciently higher quality.
The bene…t of textbook revision is not completely appropriated by the publisher. This results in the possibility of too few revisions from a societal standpoint.
In this section we have shown that the Swan type model makes the empirically inconsistent prediction that the market share of used books will make revision less attractive. Also, the …rm will never revise unless there is a signi…cant increase in the quality of the book. Further we found that the …rm may conduct fewer revisions than socially optimal.
Although frequent revisions are a common practice in the textbook industry, it seems unlikely that each revision greatly improves product quality. Signi…cant improvements in book quality with each edition may be realistic for some subjects, but not others. This logic combined with the aforementioned empirical results suggest that this variant is not a good approximation of the textbook market.
Quality Distortions
This section illustrates an important …nding in the literature on vertical di¤erentiation or quality distortions (see Mussa and Rosen 1978) . When selling to heterogeneous consumers there is often an incentive to distort the quality of lower quality products downward. Other times the publisher may want to not provide lower cost and quality alternatives and only sell to the higher value customers.
They do this in order to increase pro…ts made from the higher value consumer.
This reasoning has been extended into markets for durable goods (see Waldman 1996b, 1997;
and Hendel and Lizzeri 1999). Lower quality used goods limit the sale value of new goods. By an under investment in durability (which a¤ects secondhand quality), a durable goods monopolist can distort quality downward to increase pro…ts. This lowered quality choice is below what is socially optimal.
This strand of literature on planned obsolescence has often referred to the textbook market as an example of this type of durability distortion. One way that publishers may want to distort durability is by designing books to wear out faster. Books may have tear out problem sets or online material that expires after one use. This type of durability reduction will be discussed as an extension in section 4.4.
While limiting durability through product design is possible, another way to lower the used book value is by publishing a new edition. Since the old editions may not be readily available to all students, instructors usually assign current versions. If the current editions are often di¤erent enough from previous editions, and students are be forced to purchase the new edition. The material covered from one edition to the next may be the same, but minor di¤erences such as page numbers and questions can be di¤erent. If the student wants to keep up with the instructor's lectures, having the right book is crucial. Therefore even though older editions may be less expensive and have much the same information, they are not a close substitute for the current edition.
As in the previous subsection, printing costs will make revising less attractive. Even with quality distortions, the marginal cost savings of not revising may be signi…cant. In states where there are a lot of used books in the second period, the marginal printing cost makes revising less attractive.
However the presence of lower quality used books in the market reduces the pro…tability of the publisher. Increasing the quantity of such used books can make revision more attractive.
if it is optimal for the publisher to revise the book in state l then it is also optimal for it to revise in state h: Under some parameter conditions, revision only happens in state h:
Proof. In appendix The used books in the market have two competing e¤ects on pro…tability. The …rst as illustrated in the previous model is the cost saving e¤ect. The second e¤ect is the quality distortion e¤ect.
The presence of the lower quality used books in the market limits the pro…t the publisher gains on the high value consumer. This e¤ect worsens with the number of used books.
The e¤ect used books have on the revision decision will depend on which of these two forces are stronger. Proposition 2 gives us a su¢ cient condition for revision to be more likely with a larger stock of used books. This is when the marginal printing cost is small relative to the di¤erence in new and used book quality. As before, not killing o¤ the secondary market can reduce marginal costs. However if marginal costs are low relative to the quality di¤erence between new and used books then there may also be an incentive to eliminate these books altogether. This is true even if the consumers are forward looking.
If the marginal costs are large relative to the new and used book quality di¤erence then this result need not hold. We know from Proposition 1 that when used and new books have the same quality that revision for low numbers of used books in the market is more likely. Due to the continuous nature of this model, we get the same result when used and new book qualities are su¢ ciently close or when marginal costs are su¢ ciently high.
Empirical evidence suggests that a large quantity of used books in the market will make revision more likely. Under many parametrizations, this model is able to generate predictions that are consistent with the empirical …ndings. Proposition 2 provides su¢ cient conditions for this to hold.
Thus far in this paper we have discussed that cost savings makes revision less attractive while the incentive to distort used book quality makes revision more attractive. We now show that this distortion can be strong enough so that the …rm may want to revise the book even if there is no improvement in new book quality. That is, a publisher may choose to revise the book for the sole purpose of "killing o¤" the market for used books. Proof. In Appendix Proposition 3 defends the belief that the used product market can harm pro…ts. It states that if the used book quality is low enough (but not zero) the publisher will be willing to pay a positive revision cost in order to devalue the used books.
Pricing Under Full Commitment
Anther way to determine which model best describes the textbook market is through the prices set by the publisher. Here we look at the relationship between the stock of used books in the market and the price of used and new books. We then compare these predictions against the empirical …ndings of Bond and Iizuka (2005) .
Lemma 1 If the publisher can fully commit, if the publisher does not revise in the second period then,
1) The used book price is not a¤ ected by the stock of used books in the market.
2) If new and used books are not perfect substitutes (i.e. Q U < Q 2 ) the quantity of used books in the market increases the price of new 2nd period books.
3) If new and used books are perfect substitutes then the quantity of used books have no e¤ ect on new book price. New and used book price will be equal.
Lemma 1 states that under full commitment only when used and new books are of di¤erent quality will the stock of used books a¤ect price. If this is true then the stock of used books should increase new book price. This is because when the stock of used books is larger the …rm will not be as competitive selling new books to lower taste consumers. They will focus more on selling new books buyers with a higher taste for quality.
This result is consistent with the empirical result found by Bond and Iizuka (2005) . They …nd that the share of new books in the market increases the new book price. This result combined with Lemma 1 suggests that perfect durability does not describe the textbook market. There is perhaps a more obvious reason to believe that in the real world, new and used text books are not perfect substitutes. A trip to any college bookstore will quickly reveal that used and new copies of the same edition are seldom if ever sold for the same price. If new and used books were valued equally it is unclear why there would be such a di¤erence in their prices.
We have argued that these results on prices argue against perfect durability. In a later section we use these results to distinguishing between the quality di¤erence and time inconsistency models.
Reducing Durability Through Design
Frequent revision is not the only way that publishers have been accused of employing planned obsolescence. One common accusation against textbook publishers is that they design the textbook to limit its future value. Some of these practices include tear-out pages or bundling with electronic services that expire after a one time use. In this section we show that reducing durability in the product design phase may or may not improve pro…tability. We …nd that under the perfect substitute assumption the publisher will never reduce durability. However, if this or the full commitment assumption is not satis…ed, a reduction in durability can improve pro…tability.
The publisher has the ability to reduce second period quality from Q U to a …xed Q U where 0 < < 1: This quality reduction can be done costlessly and must be decided prior to …rst period production.
We …nd that the incentive to reduce durability depends on the default durability level. Our benchmark will be the optimal durability assumption. That is we …rst look at the incentive to reduce used book quality below perfect durability.
Proposition 4
If the initial used book quality Q U is the same as the new book quality Q 1 then the …rm will never reduce durability.
Proof. In Appendix
Similar to the results on revision Proposition 4 the publisher has no incentive to reduce book durability. Reducing the quality of the used book away from new quality has two e¤ects on pro…ts.
First since the used books are less valuable they will sell at a lower price. Second, reducing the value of the used books will increase the price consumers are willing to pay for new books. We …nd the …rst e¤ect will always be stronger when moving away from perfect durability.
It seems that durability reductions have become increasingly more popular among publishers. This suggests that perfect durability is not the correct model variant. 10 We have shown that publishers will never reduce durability away from perfect durability. It may however be pro…table for publishers to further reduce durability on less than perfectly durable books. We now show that quality reductions can improve pro…ts when used books are always less than perfect substitutes for new books.
Proposition 5
If the marginal cost of printing a book is small, then there exists some 0 < Q U < 1 2 Q 1 such that for all initial Q U Q U and all 2 (0; 1); the publisher has an incentive to reduce pro…tability.
1 0 Also it seems implausible that even hardcopy textbooks could ever survive any period of college life without some wear and tear.
Proof. In Appendix Proposition 5 gives a su¢ cient condition to when it will be pro…table for the …rm to reduce durability of used books. This happens when the used books are already of low quality and marginal cost of printing the book is su¢ ciently small.
For any revision policy where the publisher does not revise in some state, we …nd the pro…t function is U shaped with respect to used book quality (Q U ): 11 As mentioned before there are two e¤ects of a reduction on Q U on pro…ts. First, the expected resale value of the book is paid to publisher when initially sold. This naturally increases with the quality of the used book. Second the quality of the used book negatively a¤ects customer's willingness to pay for high quality new books. When used book quality is high enough, the …rst a¤ect dominates. In fact, pro…ts are always greatest when the books are perfectly durable. But, if used book quality is su¢ ciently low, the second e¤ect dominates. It becomes pro…table to further reduce durability.
If publishers are able and choose to reduce durability it a¤ects the optimal number of books sold in both periods.
Corollary 2 If …rms reduce durability, the number of books sold in both …rst and second periods increases.
Proof. In Appendix
Corollary 2 states that publishers that use durability reductions to improve pro…ts sell more new books in both periods than they would have if this were not possible. This comes as a direct result of the breaking down of the link between used and new book sales. As a result of the durability reduction there is less crowding out of new books by used books. The publisher sells more new books in the second period than they would if durability reductions were not possible. Also books sold in the …rst period have fewer adverse e¤ects on second period pro…ts. Therefore, more new books are sold in the …rst period.
Time Inconsistency
So far in this paper we have assumed that the publisher is able to commit to future actions. This assumption assumes away any time inconsistency with respect to the publisher. We now relax this assumption in order to address an important strand in the durable goods literature.
In this section, the publisher can not commit to second period actions in the …rst period. At the beginning of the 2nd period the …rm observes the state of the world and chooses to whether or not to revise and second period quantity. In this analysis we assume (as in the optimal durability model) that used and new books of the same edition are perfect substitutes. However all results and analysis are identical when we allow used books to be of lesser quality.
Since the publisher makes its second period decision in the second period, it does not appropriate the e¤ect of its decisions on …rst period pro…ts. Each used book in the second period market is a substitute for the new book. Therefore from the pro…tability of the publisher in the second period, all used books lower pro…ts. Since the publisher is able to eliminate these books through a revision, the incentive to do so is stronger when there are more books in the market. These actions may be suboptimal for the …rm from the …rst period perspective. We now show that without commitment, the publisher will be more likely to update when the stock of used books is higher.
Proposition 6
If the publisher does not have the ability to commit to period 2 actions, it will never revise in state l only. Under some conditions it will only revise in state h:
Proof. In Appendix Without commitment to future production levels, the …rm will produce more books in the later periods than would maximize …rst period pro…ts. This result is known in the literature as Coasian dynamics.
The overproduction of books in the later period is not the only source of time inconsistency. Also …rms will choose to revise in the second period when it may not be optimal from a …rst period perspective.
The stock of used books has an unambiguous a¤ect on the incentive for …rms to revise. Consistent with Iizuka (2007) , it predicts that revision is more pro…table when the stock of used books is high.
Without commitment, it is easy to see a publisher's incentive to devalue the quality of used books in the market to zero. Each used book reduces second period pro…t. Therefore the publisher will always be willing to pay in order to eliminate this competition. This is true whether the revision improves book quality or not.
then the …rm will revise in state ! even if there is no quality improvement (i.e. Q 2 = Q 1 ).
Proof. In Appendix Proposition 7 gives a much stronger prediction on when the publisher would want to "kill o¤"
the market for used books. Since the …rm does not consider this a¤ect on …rst period pro…ts, it has a signi…cant incentive to eliminate competition with the used books.
Pricing Under No Commitment
The time inconsistency model and the quality di¤erence model both suggest a need for frequent revision, durability reduction, and leasing. Therefore it is somewhat di¢ cult to distinguish which model better …ts the data. The e¤ect of used books on new book prices allows us to distinguish between the two models of planned obsolescence. We then compare these predictions against the empirical …ndings of Bond and Iizuka (2005) .
Similar to the Coase conjecture (1972) we …nd that increasing the stock of used books will result in lower prices. 12 Lemma 2 If the publisher cannot fully commit and the publisher does not revise in the second period then,
1) The used book price is negatively a¤ ected by the stock of used books in the market.
2) An increase in the quantity of used books decreased the price of new books as long as the used books are a close enough substitute to new books (i.e. Q u > Q 1
2 ).
The used books in the market e¤ectively reduces the demand for new books. Under no commitment the …rm only considers 2nd period pro…ts when making its pricing (and production) decision.
More used books means that the demand for new books has been reduced even more thus reducing the publishers 2nd period price. 
Reducing Durability Through Design (Time Inconsistency)
The durability decision is made before the books are sold. Therefore, durability not subject to time inconsistency the way in the same way as production or revision. However the publisher's decisions in later periods will change the e¤ect of durability reductions on pro…tability. The quantity and quality of used books a¤ects the second period production and revision decision. The publisher must take into consideration how current actions will a¤ect future decisions.
In order to isolate the time inconsistency aspect of the durability decision we will start with the assumption that books can be perfectly durable. Also let us …rst assume that the …rm is able to commit to a future revision decision but not future production. This assumption may seem reasonable since revision is a large observable event and could be contractible where this might be impossible for output. We now show that small reductions away from perfect durability reduces publisher pro…ts.
Proposition 8
If the initial used book quality Q U = Q 1 and the …rm can commit to a revision decision, then the …rm will never intentionally reduce book quality as long as the potential reduced used book quality is greater than 2 3 Q 1 .
Proof. In Appendix
The Proposition 8 is analogous to Proposition 4 however somewhat weaker. This weakness comes from the time inconsistency. In addition to the two previously discussed e¤ects, durability reductions now alleviate pressures caused by Coasian dynamics. 13 If the link between period is weakened through reduced durability the second period publisher's tendency to overproduce becomes less of a problem. Although durability reductions now have an addition bene…t, Proposition 8 shows that a small movement away from perfect durability lowers pro…ts. That is the e¤ect on initial book price dominates is greater than the other e¤ects combined. However large reductions in durability can improve pro…ts if the marginal cost of selling books is small. Now we examine the model when …rms are unable to commit to a revision policy or second period output. When such commitments are not possible …rst period quantity restriction can serve as a commitment device. We …nd in some cases that even a small reduction in durability can improve pro…tability by increasing optimal …rst period output.
In the second period used books are substitutes for new books and reduce second period pro…t.
The second period revision decision depends only on the pro…ts in the second period. The e¤ect on price of the resale value of used books of …rst period books is not appropriated in the revision decision. If the publisher does not revise, resale values are positive. Therefore the publisher can revise too frequently in the second period.
As with many time inconsistency problems commitment devices can be useful. The e¤ect on the expected revision decision on …rst period prices proves as an incentive for the …rm to restrict output in the …rst period. Suppose that for a given quantity of used books, revision is only slightly more pro…table for the …rm in the second period. That is, if the stock of used books were a little smaller the …rm would choose not to revise. Since the expected pro…ts in the …rst period include resale value, there is an incentive for the publisher to reduce …rst period quantity to commit itself to not revising in the future. This would result in a marginal increase in expected second period pro…ts and a signi…cant increase in the price consumers are willing to pay for the book in the …rst period. Any further marginal reduction in quantity beyond this trigger amount only lowers pro…ts.
Therefore the publisher may often produce …rst period output just at the point where it can commit its future self to not revise in some future state !.
For a publisher that is committing itself to not revise in some future state, durability reduction can serve as a substitute for …rst period quantity reduction. Reducing durability will naturally reduce the resale value of …rst books and subsequently the initial price of such books. However by reducing durability the …rm can sell more books in the …rst period without causing revision in the second period.
Proposition 9
If the publisher is unable to commit to future actions, …rm maximizes 2nd period pro…t for any stock of used books, and the following hold
uniquely maximizes expected lifetime pro…t, 2)
3)
then there exists some 2 (0; 1) such that the publisher can increase pro…ts by reducing used book quality Q U to any value above Q U .
Proposition 9 shows that pro…ts can increase even for small movements away from perfect durability. This happened through the relaxing of the low …rst period output condition.
The conditions for this proposition are very important and have a natural interpretation. Condition 1) states that the given no quality reduction (i.e. Q 1 = Q U ) the optimal …rst period production results in the highest used book quantity where the …rm does not revise in some state !: Also this …rst period quantity uniquely maximizes the problem. Condition 2) is related to it. Condition 2)
states that …rst period output is lower than if the …rm could commit to not revise in period 2 (again given no quality reduction). That is, the reduction in quantity is a commitment device that costs the …rm through fewer sales. Condition 3) concerns e¤ect of reducing durability (Q U ) away from perfect durability. There are two a¤ects of such a reduction. First, durability reductions ease the …rst period quantity restrictions. Second reducing durability lowers resale value and thus the price consumers are willing to pay in the …rst period. Condition 3) states that the e¤ect of easing the quantity restriction on pro…ts must be greater than the e¤ect of quantity. Therefore, we have now shown that additional durability reductions in the design phase are only pro…table under conditions of time inconsistency or imperfect durability.
Leasing
Another recent phenomena in the textbook market is the increasing amount of leasing. Students are able to rent textbooks for the semester then return them after they are done. Some of these arrangements are done through third party businesses such as chegg.com. Others are done directly through the publishers.
Our model has little to say about third party leasing. But, there are likely reasons for leasing that lie outside the scope of our model. For example, students may have higher capital cost than a much larger …rm. Getting the book to use during the semester requires less up front capital if only rented. Another reason for third party leasing may be a type of insurance for the student. Since it may be unclear exactly when the publisher will revise, there is some …nancial risk involved when hoping to resell the book. Third party lessors may be willing to take that risk. While these issues may be valid and important they are not fully explored in our current model.
In addition to third party leasing, leasing by the publisher has recently also been increasing.
Our model can explain the use of leasing contracts directly between the publisher and the student for both the quality di¤erence and time inconsistency speci…cations. Since we feel that the quality di¤erence model …ts best we discuss leasing in that context …rst. Our results are similar to previous results durable goods literature (ex. Hendel and Lizzeri 1999, and Waldman 1996b). We …nd that leasing can improve pro…ts if it allows for the reduction in the resale of used books.
Proposition 10 If printing costs are large relative to the di¤ erence in used and new book quality leasing will improve pro…ts.
The intuition behind Proposition 10 is that leasing allows the …rm more control over quantities in the 2nd period market. When the …rm sells a book in the …rst period and the book is sold again in the second the used book is placed on the market at zero cost. Since the resale price of the used book is part of …rst period pro…ts we can decompose the market as pro…ts made on …rst period and 2nd period students. Suppose the publisher leases in the …rst period and resells in the second. In the second period it is as if the …rm produces and sells multiple book qualities at di¤erent marginal costs. However the publisher can only sell up to the returned number of used books. If it is always optimal to resell all used books then there is no reason to lease in the …rst period. The resell price would have been incorporated in the …rst period sell price and pro…ts would be the same. However for some state ! the pro…t maximizing number of used books resold may be below the entire stock.
In this case, the …rm would improve pro…ts by limiting (but not entirely eliminating) the used books on the market. The bene…ts to leasing do not require the publisher to lease to the entire market. Optimal pro…ts can be reached if leased to enough of the market to be able to su¢ ciently reduce quantity when needed. The publisher uses leasing to achieve the pro…t maximizing mix of used and new books in the market.
The reason to lease is somewhat di¤erent in the time inconsistency model. This goes directly back to the pioneering work by Coase (1972) . By leasing, the publisher can eliminate the negative e¤ects of future decisions on expected earlier pro…ts. By leasing the publisher can eliminate the tendency to overproduce. By leasing, the resell (or lease) value of used books in later periods is accrued to the publisher in that period. By maximizing pro…ts in each period the …rm can now maximize pro…ts as a whole. Unlike the earlier result maximal pro…ts are only attained if the …rm leases to the entire market. Any used books that are resold by the consumers create the same distortions previously discussed. Therefore, if this model were correct we would expect the publisher to lease to as much of the market as possible.
Conclusion
In this paper we revisit the common belief that textbook publishers revise frequently in order to "kill o¤" the market for used books. While this view has been around for quite some time,
there is an in ‡uential strand of literature in durable goods theory that challenges this idea. These alternative theories argue that both durability decisions and revision decisions are socially optimal.
In this paper we challenge the optimal durability theory when applied to the textbook market.
Recent empirical …ndings show that publishers are more likely to revise when the market share of used books increases. We show that the theories of the textbook market based on optimal durability are inconsistent with these …ndings.
Another strand of literature suggest that frequent revisions happen as a result of an inability of the …rm to commit to future actions. We …nd that under this assumption new book price must be negative related to the stock of used books in he market. These predictions do not hold up when compared to the empirical evidence. The only variation of the model that is broadly consistent with the data is full commitment and imperfect substitutability between used and new books.
In addition to new book revision we consider the increasingly common practices of durability reduction and leasing. We show that neither of these will be pro…table if …rms are able to commit and unaltered books are perfectly durable. But they can improve pro…ts under the other two variants. The presence of these quality reducing practices serves as further evidence that the optimal durability model does not accurately describe the textbook market.
A Appendix
Proof. Of Proposition 1. Given the revision choice of the …rm, the optimal second period production decision must solve the …rst order condition,
Substituting this back into the pro…t function gives us = max
If we know that Q 1 = Q U this reduces the expression to = max
If we know that revision is optimal in state l; this means that if we …x x 1 at the optimal x 1 the pro…t for not revising in state l will be lower than the pro…t for updating at l: That is,
This and h > l imply that, at that same x 1 the publisher will always make more pro…ts by not revising in state h: This condition is strict whenever c > 0: Therefore if the publisher does not revises in state l he must also not revise in state h:
We will now show under certain conditions the publisher will revise only in state l: We know that given the revision decision R the optimal choice for x 1 =
We also know that if the …rm were to update in state h it would also update in state l. Therefore to show that the …rm revises in only state l we only need to show that revising in only l is more pro…table than not revising at all or revising in both h and l: Now we will assume that
We will now introduce notation x R 1 as the optimal …rst period production decision given the revision decision R: x R !;2 is the optimal period 2 production decision in state ! given R: A = Q 2
Note that x
: This says that under these conditions it is more pro…table to revise in only state l than not at all. Now we can use the other side of the inequality to show that it is better to revise in only state l than in both states
Here the gains for revising in period h are smaller than the …xed revision costs. Q 2
Proof. of Corollary 1. Recall that the …rm's pro…t is R = max
W herex !;2 = x !;2 + ! x 1 f or all ! = 2 R:
Substituting the optimal x 1 ; and x !;2 this simpli…es to = max
Since we know that the publisher will always revise in state l if he revises in state h we only have to look at increasing the number of states that he revises. We compare pro…ts between revising in state ! or not (keeping the revision decision in the other state …xed). If the publisher does not revise in !,x 1 is the optimal …rst period production. If revise then x 1 : The publisher will choose to revise in ! if
The social planner decision is to revise if
This reasoning can be applied to the choice between never updating in period 2 and always updating in period 2. Since K is positive, the publisher will always choose to update weakly less than is socially optimal. For certain values of K this result may be strict.
Proof. of Proposition 2. Proof by contradiction. Suppose that the …rm revises in l but not in h
This implies that at the optimum x 1 ,
Combining these inequalities This implies that
Given that the …rm will only revise in state l the …rst derivative of the objective function (17) with
evaluate this at
Since the objective function is a simple quadratic function of x 1 , the optimal x 1 must be greater than
. This is a contradiction. Here I need to show that at times the …rm will want to revise only in period h: let us compare the optimal choice if revise in h; and l, keeping the same production decision for x fh;lg 1 ; let us show that the …rm is better o¤ not revising in l. That is we need to show
The other condition that we need to show is that the …rm is more pro…table updating in state h then never updating at all. Therefore we need to show,
The su¢ cient conditions for revision in only period h are,
Proof. Of Proposition 3. The pro…t for a revision plan R R = max
The derivative of this expression with respect to Q U is,
Evaluating this expression at Q U = 0 we get q ! ! x 1 h 1
then this derivative is less than zero. If the quality of new un revised book and the revised book are the same and Q U = 0 then the optimum quantities for all revision plans are the same. Pro…ts are also the same after revision costs. Keeping the revision choice for the other state constant suppose that the derivative of the pro…t in the no revision case is less than zero.
Since this is a continuous di¤erentiable function then there exists some positive range of possible Q U where the pro…ts to revise in state ! are higher. In this range the monopolist is willing to pay a positive revision cost to produce a book of the same quality as the un revised book.
Proof. of Lemma 1 1)Recall that if the books are not revised the second period used book price is, P !;u (x 1 ; x !;2 ; R) = Q U (1 x !;2 ! x 1 ): From the …rst order condition for the second period output choice x !;2 = 1 2
Substituting in this into the price we get the used price P !;u = Q U (
) which is the same for all states ! and therefore all possible stocks of used books.
2)The 2nd period new book price is, P !;2 (x 1 ; x !;2 ; R)
Substituting the x !;2 …rst order condition, the second period new book price is, P !;2 = Q 1 ( Proof. of Proposition 6. Given a …rst period production x 1 ; the second period pro…ts in state ! if they revise,
And the pro…ts if they do not revise are, nr = max
Since h > l this pro…t will be smaller in state h: Therefore, if the publisher updates in state l it must also update in state h:
The publisher will only revise in state h if
Now I will show that the publisher will never need to commit itself to not revise in any state. If the publisher does not want to revise in state ! and chooses to produce x 1 in period 1 then
0 This condition is stronger than the condition to revise in
Therefore the publisher would never choose anx 1 to commit itself to not revise. The publisher will only revise in state h if
If the publisher choosesx to commit itself to revise in state h then
K and it will not revise in state l. Now I will provide conditions where the publisher will only revise in state h: Given that the …rm can commit to the revision decision R:
We can choose parameter values such that
and we can choose l so that
In this case the publisher would only revise in state h:
We can show that
Therefore some su¢ cient conditions for only revising in h are
Proof. of Proposition 7. The second period …rm will revise the book if Proof. Of Proposition 4 We will now show that given a revision decision by the …rm, pro…ts are increasing with the used book quality Q U on the interval ( Using the envelope theorem the derivative of this expression with respect to Q U is,
Where x !;2 ; and x 1 are the optimal production values. From the FOC on x !;2 = 
We will now show that the …rm can never increase pro…ts by reducing quality. We will show this by contradiction. Suppose that the publisher could increase pro…ts by reducing Q U : We know from Proposition 1 that pro…ts are lower if the …rm reduces used book quality to zero. By the envelope theorem as Q U decreases Q U x 1 decreases and x 2 increases. This is a di¤erent empirical prediction for quantity of books sold.
Proof. Of Proposition 8. We will now show that given a revision decision by the …rm, pro…ts are increasing with the used book quality Q U on the interval ( 
Using the envelope theorem the derivative of this expression with respect to Q U is,
d^ R dQ U = !2fh;lgnR
This is greater than zero whenever Q U > 2 3 Q 1 : Therefore if the publisher were to reduce used book quality away from Q 1 to any value above 2 3 Q 1 this would reduce pro…tability. Proof. of Proposition 9. As determined in the proof of Proposition 8. The derivative of the pro…t function with respect to Q U given a …xed revision decision is positive. Therefore without changing the revision, decision decreasing Q U must decrease pro…ts. However decreasing Q U will relax the second period revision decision. Let us look at the optimal …rst period production decision as we decrease Q U : Since note that the cuto¤ value M ! = Q U x 1 and x !;2 does not change with Q U .
Therefore the maximum pro…t can now be denoted as, 
Since
d^ (x 1 ) dQ U < 0 whenever,
Which happens whenever M ! < Proof. of Lemma 2 1)Recall that if the books are not revised the second period used book price is, P !;u (x 1 ; x !;2 ; R) =
